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CHILEAN ANTITRUST POLICY: SOME 
LESSONS BEHIND ITS SUCCESS 
FRANCISCO AGÜERO* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Sixty years ago, the state played an active role in the Chilean economy.  Since 
then, the country has undergone a failed attempt to introduce socialism through 
democracy, as well as a coup d’état that instated the Chicago School’s market-
based fiscal and monetary policies. Since 1990, the country has returned to a 
democratic path, correcting the economic model imposed by the military regime 
but without abandoning enforcement of competition policy. In fact, Chile 
introduced and established competition policy with steady advances and unusual 
success. It has been a bumpy road, but it has allowed competition agencies to 
find, prosecute, and fine more firms that infringe competition law. In the last 
decade, several cartels affecting consumers in markets such as poultry, 
pharmaceuticals, bus services, and healthcare have shifted the public opinion 
towards a strong repudiation of the most reprehensible anti-competitive 
practices. 
The following pages attempt to determine the possible reasons for and lessons 
behind Chile’s success, with a particular emphasis on analyzing anti-competitive 
practices and only brief mention of merger control. Accordingly, part II first 
explores the historical background of Chile’s current competition law regime. 
This narration shows also how political support has helped and empowered 
competition agencies in Chile, especially in the last decade. These findings 
suggest that more than good rules and good institutional design are important to 
achieving good results in antitrust policy: political support is a key factor to its 
status. Without this support, results of competition policy enforcement would 
probably differ. Part III addresses the structure and description of Chile’s current 
competition policy institutions. Part IV describes substantial issues in 
competition law in Chile that show that prohibited conducts are not limited to 
cartels and monopolization or abuse of dominance, but extend also to restrictions 
imposed by the Administration, which could endanger competition. Part V 
examines how public enforcement has focused since 2008 mostly to prosecute 
cartel cases, leaving private parties to prosecute by their own means residual 
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cases of abusive practices—both exploitative and exclusionary. The public 
economic prosecutor has yielded a successful record, which has also contributed 
to the success of the system perceived by the public. After scrutinizing the 
enforcement of competition law in Chile, part VI provides a general assessment 
of the system and its implementation. Finally, part VII closes with some 
conclusions and possible lessons in competition policy to be drawn from a country 
with a unique history of economic development.  
II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: GROWING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR 
COMPETITION POLICY 
Chile’s first competition law was Law No. 13,305, enacted in 1959.1 The law 
created an Antitrust Commission (Comisión Antimonopolios) comprised of a 
Supreme Court Justice and two chief financial regulators. In 1963, legal reform 
established the National Economic Prosecutor (NEP)2 to represent the general 
interest of the economic community before the courts, including the Antitrust 
Commission. 
Prior to 1959, the Klein-Saks Mission, an American consultancy hired by the 
Chilean government, issued a report that recommended establishing antitrust 
policy in the country.3 The report was mostly devoted to financial and monetary 
issues, focusing on severe inflation in the country.4 However, one of the few 
proposals of the Klein-Saks Mission that was not abandoned,5 was a competition 
statute contained in a section of Law No. 13,305.6 But that law had little influence 
on the Chilean economy, and in its early years, the NEP did not have an active 
role in the prosecution of anti-competitive conduct.7 
In 1969, Unidad Popular’s presidential program indicated that, if they won 
the election, the first economic measure would be to nationalize Chile’s primary 
mineral wealth and resources, which were in the hands of foreign capitalists and 
 
 1.  Law No. 13,305, Apr. 6, 1959. Law No. 13,305 was a miscellaneous law, which dealt with 
economic and financial issues. In its section V, it contained the competition act. 
 2.  Law No. 15,142, Jan. 13, 1963. 
 3.  Klein & Saks, “El Programa de Estabilización de la Economía Chilena y el Trabajo de la Misión 
Klein & Saks” Reformas económicas e Instituciones Políticas: la experiencia de la Misión Klein-Saks en 
Chile 273 (J. Couyoumdjiam ed., 2011). 
 4.  Ricardo Paredes, Jurisprudencia de las Comisiones Antimonopolios en Chile [Jurisprudence of 
the Antitrust Commissions], 58 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS 229 (1995). 
 5.  Rolf Lüders, “La Misión Klein-Saks, los Chicago Boys y la política económica” Reformas 
económicas e Instituciones Políticas: la experiencia de la Misión Klein-Saks en Chile 215 (J. 
Couyoumdjiam, ed. 2011). 
 6.  PATRICIO BERNEDO, HISTORIA DE LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA EN CHILE 1959–2010 [HISTORY 
OF COMPETITION POLICY IN CHILE 1959–2010] 39 (2013). 
 7.  Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Exámenes inter-pares de la política y del derecho de la 
competencia en América Latina: Un seguimiento Argentina, Brasil, Chile, México y Perú [Peer Reviews 
of Politics and Competition Law in Latin America: A Look at Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru] 
15 (2007). 
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“internal monopolies.”8 As expressed by Patricio Meller, before Salvador 
Allende’s socialist government came into power in 1970, left-wing parties 
characterized the Chilean economy as, among others, monopolist and capitalist.9 
The Unidad Popular’s response was not state-run competition policy, but rather 
a wave of expropriations and nationalizations of privately owned firms.10 In fact, 
to the Chilean left, even before Unidad Popular’s program, competition 
legislation had failed as a solution to the problem of cartels and the abuse of 
monopolies.11 
The Unidad Popular’s plans were ultimately frustrated by the Military Junta’s 
1973 coup d’état. In contrast to the position of the Unidad Popular government, 
the value of economic freedom was primordial in the eyes of the Junta. The 
founding document of the Junta’s economic program—known as El Ladrillo, or 
“The Brick”—posited that it was crucial to establish competitive markets12 and 
minimal state regulation in order to prevent rent-seeking practices.13 The 
liberalization process would go even beyond deregulating markets and 
privatization policies.14 According to Meller, after 1973, “the market and private 
sector became the answer to everything.”15 
The Brick eliminated most price control regulations, limiting them to public 
utilities, and encouraged the use of antitrust law as a means to attack cartels.16  
 
 
 8.  Unidad Popular, Programa básico de gobierno de la Unidad Popular [Basic Program of the 
Government of the Unidad Popular] 20 (1969) [hereinafter “Unidad Popular”]. 
 9.  PATRICIO MELLER, UN SIGLO DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA CHILENA (1890–1990) [A CENTURY 
OF CHILEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1890–1990)] 111 (3d ed. 2007).  
 10.  Unidad Popular, supra note 8, at 19. 
 11.  See generally Ricardo Lagos, La Concentración del Poder Económico. Su Teoría, Realidad 
Chilena [The Concentration of Economic Power. Its Theory and Chilean Reality] (1962) (“And the truth 
is that the great [wealth] concentration that exists in Chile, this real monopoly extends to all activities 
and won’t be destroyed with small amendments, or ‘antitrust’ laws, as we know, which are used against 
bakeries, fruit shops owners, butchers, etc.”) (“Y la verdad es que esta gran concentración que existe en 
Chile, este verdadero monopolio que alcanza a todas las actividades no va a poder ser destruido con 
pequeñas modificaciones, o con leyes “antimonopólicas” como las que en la actualidad conocemos entre 
nosotros, y que se aplican a los panaderos, a los dueños de verdulerías, a los matarifes, etc. etc.”) 
[translation by author]. 
 12.  In this way, in the following years, several market solutions were introduced in Chile in areas 
such as higher education, electricity, and water markets.  
 13.  In its early years, the economic program of the Junta was known as El Ladrillo (“The Brick”) 
and was elaborated by conservative economists during Allende’s government. The Brick became public 
only in 1992. See generally SERGIO DE CASTRO, “EL LADRILLO”: BASES DE LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 
DEL GOBIERNO MILITAR CHILENA [“THE BRICK”: BASIS OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE CHILEAN 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT] (Centro de Estudios Públicos ed. 1992).  
 14.  According to Andrés Solimano, it was also an attempt to introduce new values and change the 
culture of Chilean society as a whole. ANDRÉS SOLIMANO, CAPITALISMO A LA CHILENA: Y LA 
PROSPERIDAD DE LAS ÉLITES [CHILEAN CAPITALISM AND THE PROSPERITY OF THE ELITE] 65 (2012).  
 15.  Meller, supra note 9, at 331. See also Tomás Moulian, Chile actual. Anatomía de un mito [Chile 
Today. Anatomy of a Myth] 197–200 (1997); Gabriel Salazar & Julio Pinto, Historia Contemporánea de 
Chile. Vol. III. La Economía: Mercados, Empresarios y Trabajadores [Contemporary History of Chile. 
Vol. III. The Economy: Markets, Industries and Workers] 50–53 (2002). 
 16.  DE CASTRO, supra note 13, at 89. 
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The decision to reinforce competition law soon followed. Thus, shortly after the 
military coup, in December 1973, the Junta enacted Decree-Law No. 211.17 
In 1974, the Military Junta explicitly rejected intervention techniques such as 
central state economic planning in its Declaration of Principles (Declaración de 
Principios).18 However, the Military Junta admitted some planning in the 
economy, but recognized the key role of private-property rights and 
subsidiarity—a principle that presupposes “the right to free initiative in the 
economic field.”19 The Junta further stated that, “it is [the State’s] mission . . . to 
adopt the measures that effectively ensure competition [policy] and the necessary 
control of private parties, to avoid any form of abuse or monopoly.”20 The 1980 
Constitution did not explicitly refer to this principle with respect to the state, but 
it did establish the individual-centred right to develop any economic activity—
the freedom of enterprise.21 At the time, the adoption and promotion of 
competition policy and liberalization of markets was not a contentious issue as 
might be expected, because the military regime closed media and established 
press censorship as soon as they rose to power,22 and many opponents of a market 
economy were exiled from the country. Universities, that could have been critical 
of the economic model, suffered state-intervention, and dissident economic 
academics were fired.  The crudest example of this occurred in 1976 in 
Washington, D.C., when the Chilean secret police assassinated Orlando Letelier, 
Allende’s former ambassador to the United States. A couple of weeks before his 
assassination, Mr Letelier had linked the Chicago Boys’ market-based policies 
and repression.23 Naomi Klein has argued that this assassination could be 
connected to Letelier’s critical assessment of the economic reforms.24 
Decree-Law No. 211 established the foundations of modern competition law 
in Chile, substantially reforming the rarely enforced Law No. 13,305. Decree-Law 
No. 211 created a different institutional setting from the one designed in Law No. 
13,305. On a regional level, Decree-Law No. 211 created the Central and thirteen 
Regional Preventive Commissions, which were mostly consultative bodies, in 
order to push the heavily regulated economy towards a more liberalized market 
 
 17.  Decree-Law No. 211, Dec. 22, 1973 [hereinafter Decree-Law 211 (1973)]. 
 18.  Declaración de Principios de la Junta de Gobierno [Declaration of the Principals of the 
Government Junta], Mar. 11, 1974. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Constitución Política de la República de Chile [C.P.] art. 19 (1980).  
 22.  Junta de Gobierno, Bando No. 15. Censura y clausura de medios [Proclamation No. 15. 
Censorship and media closing] Sept. 11, 1973. 
 23. Orlando Letelier, Economic ‘Freedom’s’ Awful Toll; The ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile, 8 REV. OF 
RADICAL POL. ECON. 44–52 (1976). 
 24.  Naomi Klein, Orlando Letelier: el que lo advirtió, in ORLANDO LETELIER: EL QUE LO 
ADVIRTIÓ: LOS CHICAGO BOYS EN CHILE [ORLANDO LETELIER: HE WHO WARNED: THE CHICAGO 
BOYS IN CHILE] 35–36 (Miguel Lawner & Hernán Soto eds., 2011) (“it is difficult not to think that 
[Letelier’s] murder was an act of vengeance for the text that you have now in your hands”) (“es difícil no 
pensar que el asesinato fue un acto de venganza por el texto que ahora usted tiene en sus manos”) 
[translation by author]. 
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economy.25 The Preventive Commissions could also conduct ex officio 
proceedings, requesting the NEP’s Office (NEPO) to investigate possible 
infringements of competition law.26 This role was crucial in the early years of the 
military government, which was a time of transition towards competitive 
markets.27 Indeed, the Central Preventive Commission continued to be an active 
institution until its dissolution in 2003,28 issuing more than 1,200 decisions in thirty 
years.29 The initial promotion of competition policy in an economy that was 
moving from a socialist revolution to a capitalist one, needed more and better 
competition institutions. 
On a national level, Decree-Law No. 211 created the five-member Resolutive 
Commission (Comisión Resolutiva).30 Like the Preventive Commissions, the 
Resolutive Commission could start ex officio inquiries or pursue NEPO’s or 
private claims. Additionally, it could issue general regulations, propose legal or 
regulatory amendments, and request criminal sanctions.31 However, even until 
2003, both the Central Preventive Commission and the Resolutive Commission 
held their respective sessions in the same area at NEPO’s offices in Santiago, and 
lacked of budget and staff. 32 Members of Preventive Commissions and the 
Resolutive Commission worked ad honorem in their antitrust duties.33 The 
members of these commissions were appointed and lacked sufficient 
independence from political authorities. Before the 2003 reform, the institutional 
design for competition authorities in Chile resembled a bifurcated administrative 
model. In it, NEPO investigated and submitted cases before another 
administrative agency–court—a regional preventive commission, the Central 
Preventive Commission, or the Resolutive Commission. 
After almost twenty years of continuing work and success in regulated 
markets,34 the institutional design started to show cracks and the need of reform. 
Thus, in the mid-nineties, a well-reputed economist—and former member of the 
Central Preventive Commission—argued that the appointment of two of the 
members of the Commissions by the politicians could present probable 
 
 25.  Decree-Law No. 2760, July 3, 1979. 
 26.  Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 6, art. 8(d). 
 27.  Law No. 19,911, CREACIÓN DE TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA LIBRE 
COMPETENCIA, Aug. 20, 2002, (Presidential Bill of Law creating Competition Tribunal). 
 28.  See generally BERNEDO, supra note 6. 
 29.  For data see Decisiones Comisiones Antimonopolio: FISCALIA NACIONAL ECONOMICA, 
http://www.fne.gob.cl/jurisprudencia-en-libre-competencia/decisiones-comisiones-antimonopolio/. 
 30.  Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 16. 
 31.  Id. at art. 17. 
 32.  Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Chile—Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy 28 
(2004). 
 33.  Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 30. 
 34.  Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, Efectos de la privatización de servicios públicos en Chile, in 
BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, SERIE DE ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS Y SOCIALES CSC-07-
009 (2007); Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, Evaluación de la regulación de las telecomunicaciones en Chile, 
6 REVISTA PERSPECTIVAS 1 (Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile 2002). 
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interferences by the Executive.35 Other Chilean academics shared this critical 
assessment.36 In the late-nineties, a presidential commission devoted to assessing 
reforms to economic and competition regulators, proposed the creation of a 
Competition Commission, a body with national jurisdiction that would hear cases 
regarding competition law, unfair trade practices, and antidumping measures.37 
Its decisions would be appealable to a specialized tribunal, the National 
Economic Tribunal.38 
In 1999, future President Ricardo Lagos explicitly endorsed a program that 
would strengthen competition policies—despite having rejected competition 
policy as a tool against wealth concentration in the early sixties.39 His program 
included recommendations regarding competition law, specifying the need for 
institutional reforms.40 
At the same time, Libertad y Desarrollo, a conservative think tank, proposed 
the creation of a specialized tribunal in competition affairs because of new 
enforcement powers the NEP gained in 1999.41 Thus, according to this think tank, 
the 1999 legal reform evidenced the need to create an independent tribunal that 
could counterbalance the NEPO with specialized and permanent judges, 
including both economists and lawyers in its composition.42 This proposal led to 
a growing consensus among specialists of the need to establish an independent 
competition tribunal.43 Hence, political support in the field of antitrust and 
competition policy translated into constant and growing support for legislative 
reform.  The creation of a Competition Tribunal gained definite momentum in 
2001,44 after a policy was proposed by one of the largest business associations in 
Chile to the Chilean government. 
Thus, in the early 2000s, Lagos’ government promoted the creation of the 
Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia or Competition Tribunal, 
eliminating both the Preventive Commissions and the Resolutive Commission 
 
 35.  Paredes, supra note 4, at 232. 
 36.  Alberto Hurtado University, Institucionalidad Antimonopolios [Antitrust Institutions] Informe 
Tasc 81, 82 (1997).  
 37.  Comisión Presidencial de Modernización de la Institucionalidad Reguladora del Estado. 
Informe final (“Informe Jadresic”) [Presidential Commission of Modernization of the Regulatory 
Institutions of the State. Final Report (“Jadresic Report”)] 126 (1998). 
 38.  Id. at 130. 
 39.  LAGOS, supra note 11. 
 40.  Ricardo Lagos, Para crecer con igualdad [To Grow with Equality] 5 (1999).  
 41.  Law No. 19,610, May 19, 1999. 
 42.  María de la Luz Domper & Pablo Kangiser, Comisión Antimonopolios: Reformas pendientes al 
Decreto Ley 211 y la Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Antitrust Commission: Pending Reforms to 
Decree-Law 211 and Competition Policy], 95 LIBERTAD Y DESARROLLO, SERIE INFORME ECONÓMICO  
11 (1998). 
 43.  Patricio Rojas & Félix Berríos, Competencia en Chile: Cuánto se ha avanzado, 255 SERIE 
INFORME ECONÓMICO  32 (2016). 
 44.  The Agenda Pro Crecimiento [Pro-Growth Agenda] was proposed by SOFOFA—a business 
trade association—to Ricardo Lagos, then President, in the Annual Dinner of the Industry. Specifically, 
the proposal contained macroeconomic and microeconomic initiatives, which tried to increase 
competitiveness and sustain growth.  
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and reinforcing the autonomy and independence of the competition authorities 
from the NEPO and political actors.45 In the justification of the draft bill the 
government argued that the over-all consensus was that even though the regional 
preventive commissions and the Resolutive Commission did not fulfil 
requirements of administrative independence, specialization, dedication, and 
human and budgetary resources, they had accomplished their tasks successfully 
during the first thirty years of Decree-Law 211.46 However, a more globalized 
economy and critical comments from the private sector demanded regulatory 
reform, making way for a new institutional framework for competition law in 
Chile.47 
The frequently cited example of intervention is the 2003 resignation of a 
member of the Resolutive Commission appointed by the Executive who voted 
against a proposal of a telecommunications company filed at the Commission.48 
It is said that the member who resigned was subjected to strong verbal pressures 
from the Chilean government.49 Notwithstanding that the resignation occurred 
after the Competition Tribunal’s bill of law was sent to Congress in 2002, the 
publicity of the situation may have spurred the reform. The 2003 reform also de-
criminalized all anti-competitive conducts, including cartels.50 Since 1973, cartels 
were only once criminally prosecuted, and many argued that the criminal 
prohibition was unconstitutional. Besides a case of a taxicab cartel in 1994,51 the 
Resolutive Commission has requested criminal prosecution on one occasion—
the banking nationalization case.52 The constitutionality issue could have been a 
problem if the general criminal offense would have been challenged at the 
Constitutional Court. Another reason mentioned by a legal advisor of the 
Ministry of Economy was the null dissuasive effect of the criminal offense.53 So 
technical reasons existed for eliminating the general criminal antitrust offense, 
though it could have been limited to a cartel offense. To counterbalance the 
elimination of the criminal offense, higher fines would be imposed on anti-
competitive practices.54 
Subsequently, just after the creation of the Competition Tribunal in 2004, 
several pages of Michelle Bachelet’s 2005 government program were devoted to 
new reforms regarding competition policy matters, especially cartel prosecution 
 
 45.  Law No. 19,911, supra note 27. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  BERNEDO, supra note 6, at 161. 
 49.  Daniel Matamala, Las presiones de Lagos para favorecer a empresas españolas, CIPER CENTRO 
DE INVESTIGACIÓN PERIODÍSTICA (Feb. 25, 2016) http://ciperchile.cl/2016/02/25/las-presiones-de-lagos-
para-favorecer-a-empresas-espanolas/ [https://perma.cc/3THP-HZV2]. 
 50.  Law No. 19,911, supra note 27, at art. 1, no. 1. 
 51.  RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 413 (May 5, 1994). 
 52.  RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 14 (May 18, 1975).  
 53.  Enrique Sepúlveda Rodríguez, Nuevo Tribunal de defensa de la libre competencia y su 
importancia para el sector eléctrico, 12 REVISTA DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO ECONÓMICO 147 
(2004). 
54.    Law No. 19,911, supra note 27. 
AGÜERO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2016  9:47 AM 
130 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 123 
and leniency, among others.55 The case for reform was, in part, due to the demand 
for a more independent Competition Tribunal. 
More significantly, the amendments were in response to a demand for more 
vigorous cartel prosecution. Therefore, new enforcement powers were given to 
the NEPO.56 This was a consequence of the 1999 reform, which had not given 
sufficient intervention powers to the NEPO, and because the 2003 reform had 
not addressed the issue.57 
A 2009 event spurred a large shift in Chilean society’s approach to cartels and 
competition law: the Pharmacies cartel case.58 The Pharmacies case involved a 
cartel between the three largest pharmacy chains in Chile, which comprised over 
90% of the market and involved more than 200 products.59 After NEPO brought 
an accusation to the Competition Tribunal, one of the accused firms, FASA, 
agreed to settle. FASA confessed its executives and managers’ participation in 
the cartel.60 FASA’s admission of anti-competitive activity resulted in a public 
outcry.61 Competition law may have been unfamiliar to the common Chilean 
before the case, but since the Pharmacies case, both “cartel” and “collusion” are 
words commonly and correctly used in daily conversation. The scope of products 
involved in this cartel and the number of affected consumers produced a relevant 
shift in the political support for competition law reforms. 
In 2009, after three years of slow discussion in Congress, and after one of the 
firms of the Pharmacies case settled and confessed its participation in a cartel, 
congressional representatives from both conservative and progressive sectors 
swiftly approved a bill promoted by Bachelet’s government, which introduced 
leniency and intrusive powers in cartel cases.62 
In the same year, and with the Pharmacies proceedings fully underway, 
Bachelet’s government amended a draft bill criminalizing cartels,63 despite the 
decriminalization reform carried out in 2003 under Lagos’s government. This was 
also a shift from Bachelet’s program, which had not considered criminalization 
of cartels, but rather only increasing civil fines, as a policy tool. This change of  
 
 
 
 55.  Michelle Bachelet, Estoy contigo, Programa de Gobierno 2006–2010 [I am with You, 
Government Program 2006–2010] 42–44 (2005).  
 56.   Presidential Bill of Law that amends Decree by force of Law N° 1, from the Ministry of 
Economy, Development and Reconstruction, Bulletin N° 4234-03 (June 20, 2006). 
 57.  See generally Law No. 19,911, supra note 27; Law No. 19,610, May 19, 1999. 
 58.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 9, 2008, “Requerimiento de la Fiscalía Nacional Económica 
contra Farmacias Ahumada, Cruz Verde y Salcobrand” (Chile) [hereinafter Pharmacies]. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Acuerdo de conciliación Fiscalía Nacional Económica y Farmacias Ahumada S.A. 2 [Agreement 
between NEPO and Farmacias Ahumada S.A.] March 13, 2009 (Chile). 
 61.  BERNEDO, supra note 6, at 185. 
 62.  Law No. 20,361, July 13, 2009 [hereinafter Decree-Law 211 (2009)]. 
 63.  Michele Bachelet, Indicación sustitutiva al proyecto de ley que impone penas por delitos que 
atenten contra la libre competencia [Substitutive ammendment to the bill of law that criminalizes 
infringments to competition law], Bill of Law No. 6438-03, June 10, 2009. 
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the political attitude towards the criminal offense was a result of the public anger 
after the Pharmacies cartel and also of limiting the scope of the offense to cartels. 
The presidential program of President Piñera also advocated for deepening 
competition in the markets. Notwithstanding, his proposal was limited to 
improving the selection mechanism of the Prosecutor, advocating for the Senate’s 
participation in the appointment process.64 While this legal reform was ultimately 
not promoted by President Piñera, in 2011, after the NEPO alleged collusion 
against three poultry meat companies in the Poultry Producers case,65 he created 
a presidential advisory committee for competition matters, which studied the 
criminalization of cartels and other legal changes. Piñera’s government did not 
implement any of the reforms proposed by the presidential advisory committee 
in 2012, probably after a split vote on criminal prosecution.66 However, after the 
Supreme Court decision in the Pharmacies’ case, the National Consumer Agency 
(Servicio Nacional del Consumidor) filed a parens patriae civil action for 
damages caused by the cartel.67 This lawsuit was a highly controversial due to the 
agency’s standing,68 and the difficulty of effectively compensating affected 
consumers. But it showed that a different agency could take action on cartel 
damages on behalf of consumers. 
After the Pharmacies and Poultry Producers cases, members of Congress 
became constant promoters of competition reform. Thus, since 2009, almost 
twenty bills of law have been submitted to the Chilean Congress featuring 
proposals ranging from the criminalization of collusion to the legitimization of 
consumer class actions for pursuing damages in competition matters.69 
More recently, in the latest presidential elections, the government programs 
of the main candidates focused on the protection of competition and the 
repression of practices incompatible with consumer protection. In this manner, 
the right-wing candidate’s program affirmed that “consumers will be respected, 
there will be more competition and safeguards because we want a country 
without room for abuses.”70 For her part, President Bachelet’s government 
program also sought to protect competition in specific markets, indicating that 
 
 64.  Sebastián Piñera, Programa de Gobierno para el cambio el futuro y la esperanza Chile 2010–
2014 [Government Program for Future Change and Chilean Hope 2010–2014] 31 (2009). 
 65.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 1, 2011, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Agrosuper y 
Otros” (Chile). 
 66.  Comisión Asesora Presidencial para la Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Presidential Advisory 
Committee for Competition Law] July, 2012. 
 67.  Servicio Nacional del Consumidor [National Consumer Agency], Feb. 1, 2013, “Servicio 
Nacional del Consumidor con Cruz Verde S.A. y otros”, rol de la causa C 1940-2013.  
 68.  Francisco Agüero & Nicolás Rojas, Legitimación del SERNAC para demandar colectivamente 
los daños causados a los consumidores por conductas Anticompetitivas [Legal standing of the Consumer 
Protection Service to sue damages in class actions for the damages caused to consumers by 
anticompetitive practices], Santiago, 2013. 
 69.  To search the number of bills filed by representatives in the Chilean Congress between January 
2009 and February 2016, see CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE CHILE, www.camara.cl. 
 70.  Evelyn Matthei, Un siete para Chile, Programa Presidencial Evelyn Matthei 2014–2018 [A 
Seven for Chile. Evelyn Matthei Presidential Program 2014–2018] 7 (2013). 
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the NEPO would assess markets with persistent failures or that suffered from the 
impact of competition regulations, regulating when market failures justified it 
and amending unjustified restrictions to correct the operation of competitive 
markets.71 Additionally, reforms were promoted to strengthen the institutional 
features of the NEPO and the Competition Tribunal, raise maximum fines, and 
disqualify persons convicted of anti-competitive behavior from serving on 
company boards and holding positions in trade associations.72 
The government program also sought to reinforce regulations against 
collusion, studied the criminalization of the most damaging cartels, and 
established a merger control regime.73 The proposed law was enacted in 2016, 
following two accusations brought by the NEPO to the Competition Tribunal 
regarding cartels dealing with tissue paper74 and supermarkets.75 These two 
cartels produced significant outcry in public opinion, including consumer-
organized boycotts against the supermarkets.76 
With the political anger against these cartels—involving one of the richest 
Chilean fortunes—Law No. 20,945 was enacted in August 2016.77 Besides 
establishing criminal fines for hard-core cartels, this reform allows the NEP to 
prosecute cartel offenses at a criminal court only after a condemning decision of 
the Competition Tribunal (TDLC),78 thereby coordinating the effects of leniency 
applications and criminal prosecution. The law also incorporates interlocking 
prohibitions,79 higher fines for anti-competitive practices (up to 30% of the sales 
of the products associated with the infringement),80 a merger review system with 
an administrative procedure and a possible review of remedies at the 
Competition Tribunal,81 and ability to file anti-competitive damages lawsuits at 
the TDLC.82 The TDLC is a specialized competition law tribunal constituted by 
lawyers and economists with competition policy background, which decides 
lawsuits and administrative petitions brought for its decision, with separate 
proceedings for competition law infringement cases and other related matters 
(including, merger review and rulemaking, among others). 
 
 
 71.  Michelle Bachelet, Chile de todos. Programa de Gobierno Michelle Bachelet 2014–2018 [Chile 
of All. Government Program for Michelle Bachelet 2014–2018] 61 (2013). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, October 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de CMPC Tissue 
S.A. y SCA Chile S.A.” (Chile) [hereinafter CPMC Tissue]. 
 75.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, January 6, 2016, “Requerimiento en contra de Cencosud S.A., 
SMU S.A. y Walmart Chile S.A. (supermercados)” (Chile). 
 76.  Alta adherencia en redes sociales al “boicot ciudadano” contra supermercados (Jan. 8, 2016), 
LaTercera.com. 
 77.  Law No. 20,945, Aug. 30, 2016 [hereinafter Decree-Law No. 211 (2016)]. 
 78.  Decree-Law No. 211 (2016) at art. 62–64. 
 79.  Id. at art. 3, (d). 
 80.  Id. at art. 26. 
 81.  Id. at art.  46-61. 
 82.  Id., at art. 30. 
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 Because of these cartel accusations, support for reforms to the competition 
law is wide and transversal. Even congressional representatives of the 
Communist Party voted for the creation of an Investigation Committee in the 
Chamber of Representatives for cartels and the causes that could have favored 
them.83 Thus, politicians have made competition policy reform a central part of 
their agenda, showing an unusual area of regulatory consensus between 
liberalized market promoters and robber-baron prosecutors. 
Naturally, not all Chileans shared the Junta’s devotion to markets and 
competition.  Even at its inception, some conservative authors opposed the 
imposed free-market model, naming it an “anti-state system.”84 Although the end 
of the military regime in 1990 marked a political shift toward a social market 
economy, a quarter of a century later, support for competition policies and 
repression of cartels transcends political party lines and is not solely a monopoly 
of the right. Such policies even receive the recent and explicit support of the 
Communist Party, at least in the prosecution of cartels.85 Despite the consensus 
in favor of a market-based economy, there are differences in the suggested means 
of implementing reforms. On the one hand, conservative think tanks have played 
a relevant role promoting institutional reforms such as the Competition 
Tribunal,86 though paradoxically in other cases they have argued against 
increasing fines or criminal punishment for anti-competitive practices.87 On the 
other hand, and even before the return of democracy in 1990, liberal and 
progressive think tanks were instrumental in promoting free markets while 
emphasizing the state’s role in regulating markets.88 The system is a legacy of the 
dictatorship, but it is strongly accepted, showing how a “culture of competition” 
has grown and nurtured in Chile, between the private and public sector and 
throughout the political spectrum.89 
Consequently, there is an important political push to improve the institutional 
character of competition law, elevating it to the highest international standards 
and seeking greater independence for the bodies that defend it. Legal reform 
coupled with such political support helps obtain positive and efficient results. 
  
 
 83.  Bancada PC-IC valoró creación de comisión investigadora por colusión del papel tisúes, 
CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE CHILE (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.camara.cl/prensa/ 
noticias_detalle.aspx?prmid=127905 [hereinafter Bancada PC-IC].  
 84.  Mario Góngora, Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX 
[Historical essay on the notion of State in Chile, during the XIX and XX centuries] 134 (1981). 
 85.  Bancada PC-IC, supra note 59. 
 86.  Domper & Kangiser, supra note 42.  
 87.  Libertad y Desarrollo, Colusión: ¿Sanción Penal? [Cartels: Criminal Offense?], 915 TEMAS 
PÚBLICOS 4 (2009). 
 88.  MANUEL GARATE, LA REVOLUCIÓN CAPITALISTA DE CHILE (1973–2003) [THE CAPITALIST 
REVOLUTION IN CHILE (1973–2003)] 362 (2012). 
 89.  Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Success and Limits of Competition Law & Policy in Developing 
Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 9–12. 
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III 
STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE OF THE CHILEAN COMPETITION POLICY 
REGIME 
A. Structure and Appointments of the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office 
According to Decree-Law 211, the NEPO is a decentralized public service, 
with legal personality and assets of its own, independent from any other entity or 
service, and subject to the surveillance of the President of the Republic, through 
the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism.90 
The NEPO is headed by the National Economic Prosecutor (NEP), who is 
appointed by the President through a selection process of senior public officials 
provided by Law 19,882.91 Exceptionally, the NEP remains in office for four years 
and may be re-appointed only once. He can only be removed as ordered by the 
President, with the approval of the Supreme Court, upon request of the Ministry 
of Economy, Development and Tourism. The removal must be issued by the 
Supreme Court’s plenary, convened to that effect and must garner the vote of the 
majority of its members in cases of mental incapacity or manifest negligence in 
the performance of his duties.92 
This law provides a mechanism for selection of civil servants that is 
meritocratic but also has a political component, since the NEP is eventually 
appointed by the President, after a Civil Service proposal. For example, the 
current NEP, Felipe Irarrazábal (appointed in 2010, and reelected in 2014 until 
2018) is a Fulbright scholar, and prior to his appointment was a partner at a top 
Chilean law firm and professor of economic law at one of the best Chilean 
universities.93 The former NEP, Enrique Vergara, was appointed by the President 
in 2006 through a different process, and after leaving the NEPO in 2010, worked 
shortly in a medium-size law firm, before being appointed to the Competition 
Tribunal in 2012.94 
The staff and personnel of the NEPO must provide exclusive dedication to 
performing their positions, which are incompatible with all other duties in the 
Administration of the State, except university lecturing.95 The prosecutor’s staff 
has a special system of compensation, which is higher than the scheme for the 
Chilean Public Administration but equivalent to economic utility regulators.96 
  
 
 90.  Decree-Law No. 211 art. 33, Nov. 14, 2003 [hereinafter Decree-Law 211 (2003)]. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  The profile of the current NEP is available online. See, e.g., Biography of Felipe Irarrázabal 
Philippi, Who We Are, FISCAL NACIONAL ECONÓMICO, http://www.fne.gob.cl/fne/organigrama/fiscal-
nacional-economico/ [https://perma.cc/7AJQ-2LKE].  
 94.  See Biography of Enrique Vergara V, TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA, 
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/enrique-vergara-v/ [https://perma.cc/3P4Q-UCQQ].  
 95.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 38. 
 96.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, art. 36–37. 
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According to the law, the NEP is independent from the authorities and 
tribunals and has broad powers to investigate competition law infringements.97 
This independence extends even to the ability to prosecute public officers and 
regulators.98 The NEP represents the general interest of the economic community 
before courts.99 Therefore, the NEP may defend the interests entrusted to him or 
her, in the manner deemed lawful, according to his or her own assessment.100 
B. Investigations And Administrative Procedure 
The NEP has the power to conduct investigations deemed appropriate to 
prove infringement of Decree-Law No. 211, and may provide notice of its 
initiation to the affected party.101 However, with the knowledge of the President 
of the Competition Tribunal, the NEP may determine that the investigations 
conducted ex officio or by virtue of complaints are restricted or confidential, 
which could be the case with cartels.102 The NEP also may act as a party 
representing the general interest before the TDLC and the courts of justice, with 
all duties and powers vested in that role.103 Criminal investigations and causes of 
that nature are excluded from the NEP. This is especially relevant due to the re-
criminalization of cartels—participating in a cartel was once a criminal offense, 
was de-criminalized in 2003, and it became a criminal offense again in 2016.104 
During investigations, the NEP may request the TDLC to adopt precautionary 
measures regarding the investigations the NEPO is undertaking.105 The NEPO 
may request any information from public agencies and private parties for ongoing 
investigations.106 During investigations, the NEP may also summon for or request 
a written declaration from legal representatives, administrators, consultants, or 
dependents of the entities or people that could have knowledge of facts, acts, or 
conventions that are the subject of the investigations.107 
In that sense, the NEPO does not have to prosecute all private complaints. 
Since 2009, the NEPO must to receive and investigate, according to its duties, the 
complaints made by private parties with respect to actions that could infringe the 
norms of the present law. But the NEPO may determine if an investigation must 
be made or the complaints formulated dismissed within a sixty-day period. The 
 
 97.  Id. at art. 39. 
 98.  See generally Nicole Nehme, Aplicación de las normas de defensa de la competencia a los 
Organismos de la Administración del Estado [Competition Law applied to Administrative Bodies], in LA 
LIBRE COMPETENCIA EN EL CHILE DEL BICENTENARIO, [COMPETITION LAW IN BICENTENNIAL 
CHILE] 318 (2011). 
 99.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 39(b). 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. at art. 39(a). 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at art. 39(b). 
 104.  Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 1; Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90 at art. 1; 
Decree-Law 211 (2016), supra note 77 at art. 62. 
 105.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90 at art. 39(c). 
 106.  Id. at art. 39(f)–(h). 
 107.  Id. at art. 39(j). 
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NEPO may also determine whether to summon background or declarations from 
private parties that may have knowledge related to an alleged violation.108 
Regarding intrusive measures, it was only after legal reform in 2009 that the 
NEP could request from the TDLC and the corresponding Minister of the Court 
of Appeals authorization for dawn-raiding public or private premises for 
evidence of a cartel infringement. With the abovementioned authorizations, the 
NEPO can wiretap communications and order any telecommunications company 
to provide copies and records of transmitted or received communications 
made.109 
In prosecuting cartels, the NEPO must receive leniency applications from 
private applicants,110 and may later file a claim before the TDLC. If the Tribunal 
considers that the cartel conduct alleged by the NEPO is proven, it cannot fine 
the leniency applicant unless the applicant was the organizer of the illicit conduct, 
coercing the others to participate in the collusion.111 
The NEPO oversees compliance with judicial decisions regarding 
competition law including general rules issued by the TDLC and merger 
remedies, among others.112 The NEPO issues reports requested by the TDLC 
where the NEP is not acting as a party.113 The NEPO may also sign extrajudicial 
agreements or settlements with agents involved in investigations for safeguarding 
competition in the markets.114 
After the NEPO files a claim at the Competition Tribunal, it has the same 
rights and duties as a private party litigating before that Tribunal. It has been 
recognized by the Competition Tribunal that it prosecutes the case in equivalent 
terms as any other party with no procedural privileges towards the NEPO.115 
C. Structure And Appointments Of The Competition Tribunal 
The Competition Tribunal was established in 2004 after Law No. 19,911 was 
enacted, amending the Chilean competition law created by Decree-Law No. 211 
of 1973. The TDLC is a specialized and independent jurisdictional body, subject 
to the steering, correctional and economic oversight of the Supreme Court and 
whose purpose is to prevent, correct, and punish infringements to competition 
 
 108.  Decree-Law 211 (2009), supra note 62, at art. 41.  
 109.  Id. at art. 39(n). 
 110.  Id. at art. 39 bis. 
 111.  Id. at art. 39(b). 
 112.  Id. at art. 39(d).  
 113.  Id. at art. 39(e). 
 114.  Id. at art. 39(ñ). 
 115.  Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs: 
Competition Committee, Procedural Fairness: Transparency Issues in Civil and Administrative 
Enforcement Proceedings 2010 343, n.2 (2011) [hereinafter OECD Procedural Fairness] (“If it submits 
charges, the FNE prosecutes the case in the adversarial procedure before the Competition Tribunal, 
representing the public interest, but in equivalent terms as any other party, with no particular procedural 
privileges.”). 
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law.116 Its judges are appointed through a public contest. The TDLC’s judges have 
two possible professional backgrounds: three are lawyers, two are economists. 
The President is also an attorney, proposed by the Supreme Court to the 
President of the Republic. 
A mixed composition of judges (lawyers and economists) is unusual for 
Chilean tribunals. The TDLC’s model seems to be successful, because it was 
followed as a model for the Environmental Tribunals.117 However, the mixed 
composition is tributary of the mixed composition of the Commission established 
in 1959, and of the Resolutive Commission in 1973. On the one hand, the 
presence of economists as judges has been helpful and provided robust economic 
justification in TDLC’S decisions. Since there are two members, there are cases 
of split votes with good economic arguments on both sides. On the other hand, 
the presence of judges in the TDLC with no formal legal training may produce 
different or contradictory decisions in evidentiary or procedural issues.118 The 
elimination of a Supreme Court judge sitting as TDLC’s President, which was the 
model since 1959 until 2003, was proposed in the draft bill that allowed the TDLC 
to continue. This proposal was rejected during the congressional debate, due to 
reasonable arguments about Supreme Court review, the lack of competition law 
experience of Supreme Court justices, and necessary specialization of judges;119 
leading the way to a system where the Supreme Court proposes five candidates 
to the President of the Republic. 
The Competition Tribunal’s budget is approved annually pursuant to the 
Public Sector Budget Law.120 Several public bodies may intervene in the process 
for selecting judges. The President of the TDLC is appointed by the President of 
the Republic from a roster of five candidates compiled by the Supreme Court via 
a public examination and selection process. Two of the judges are appointed by 
the Council of the Central Bank. The other two members, also one from each 
professional area, will be appointed by the President of the Republic, based on 
two nominations of three candidates, one for each appointment, compiled by the 
Council of the Central Bank. In both cases, the judges are appointed or proposed 
via an examination and selection process.121 
The Competition Tribunal also has two alternate members, one an attorney 
and the other an economist. A sort of revolving-door restriction has been set, 
limiting the chance that a former NEP or person holding any other management 
position in the NEPO in the year before the initiation of the selection process is 
appointed, whether as a permanent or alternate member of the Tribunal. 
 
  116.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 5.  
 117.  Law No. 20,600 (2012).  
 118.  Francisco Agüero & Santiago Montt, Chile: The Competition Law System and the Country’s 
norms, in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES 149, 
182–83 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013). 
 119.  Law No. 19,911, supra note 27. 
  120.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 44(a). 
 121.  Id. at art. 6. 
AGÜERO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2016  9:47 AM 
138 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 123 
The members of the TDLC are subject to a regime of prohibitions. Therefore, 
being a member of the Tribunal is incompatible with being a public employee, 
administrator, private company manager or employee, or advisor in matters 
related to competition law for persons under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.122 
However, until recently, there has been consistent debate about the compatibility 
of TDLC’s judges and other professional work exempted from the mentioned 
prohibitions. In fact, at least two former judges continued working in their law 
firms while serving as judges at the TDLC. Other competition law practitioners 
believed these judges had a conflict of interest, and also had a comparative 
advantage in their private practice. This possibility will cease in 2016, after the 
enactment of Law No. 20,945. Notwithstanding, being a member of the Tribunal 
is compatible with academic positions.123 Besides deciding on competition law 
infringements and mergers, the Competition Tribunal may issue regulations or 
instructions, which must be observed by private individuals executing or entering 
into acts or contracts that are related to or that could infringe upon free 
competition.124 The Tribunal may also propose the amendment or derogation of 
any law or regulation which the Tribunal deems contrary to competition law, as 
a constitutional review.125 The laws and regulations to be examined are chosen by 
the TDLC after a petition from the NEPO, a private party, or ex officio by the 
Tribunal. The TDLC may also issue special reports to rate-setting regulators 
regarding competitive conditions in specific markets including 
telecommunications, electricity, water, sewage, and natural gas.126 
Private litigation before the TDLC has a broad scope, and the TDLC must 
hear, upon request by any party or the NEPO, complaints about conduct that 
could violate competition law. Private lawsuits or requests can be brought at the 
TDLC, whether in adversarial or non-adversarial procedures. 
The following figure describes the institutional arrangement in Chile: 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at art. 18.3. 
 125.  Id. at art. 18.4. 
 126.  Id. at art. 18.5. 
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Thus, the 2003 legal reform established “a bifurcated model of competition 
policy institutions, having on the one hand the NEPO, a specialized competition 
investigative body filing claims, and on the other, the Competition Tribunal, a 
specialized competition law tribunal that decides the claims and lawsuits brought 
for its decision.”127 Under this bifurcated judicial system, an administrative 
agency (NEPO) investigates and submits cases before a tribunal (Competition 
Tribunal) that performs functions that are jurisdictional in nature (deciding 
conflicts with res judicata effect). For its part, the bifurcated judicial model 
constitutes a form of competition governance that privileges the rights and 
freedoms of potentially affected parties by requiring the decisionmaking to be 
conducted in the form of a judicial instead of purely administrative proceeding. 
Given that there can be a compromise or trade-off between justice and efficiency, 
or between adjudication and implementing public policies,128 efficiency and 
implementation are sacrificed to safeguard justice and adjudicatory rights. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that if the bifurcated judicial model is 
accompanied by legislation that is open and undetermined, the judicial body 
winds up in a position as “commerce regulator.” The Tribunal will add content 
to the law by resolving individual cases, where such Tribunal is the entity that 
ultimately adopts the decisions of public policy that are relevant in terms of 
competition.129 This has led to the conclusion that in Chilean law the TDLC is 
actually a commerce regulator.130 This conclusion follows from the fact that 
Article 3 of Decree-Law No. 211 is, in fact, a “blank check,” where the authority 
to define Competition Law and Policy remains delegated to the TDLC mainly 
through the channel of resolving disputes jurisdictionally,131 but retaining several 
administrative powers, such as the power to issue general regulations. In that 
sense, the Competition Tribunal is a judicial body, able to adjudicate in cases of 
anti-competitive practices prosecuted by the NEPO or a private party, and in 
cases of its consultative power. The TDLC will now also adjudicate as a tribunal 
when it awards damages and reviews NEPO’s decisions in mergers. However, this 
Tribunal has powers that are more than unusual for a judicial body, such as its 
regulatory powers. Those cases demand a different approach because TDLC’s 
decisions are not subject to res judicata effects. 
 
 127.  Francisco Agüero & Santiago Montt, supra note 118, at 153.  
 128.  See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983) (“In a legal culture largely oriented 
toward court enforcement of individual rights, ‘administration’ has always seemed as antithetical to ‘law’ 
as ‘bureaucracy’ is to ‘justice.’ Law focuses on rights, administration on policy.”).  
 129.  It can be argued that the TDLC is not a tribunal but a court, a difference not clear in Chilean 
jurisdiction. This difference resembles administrative law in the United States or Canada, where tribunal 
members are part of an adjudicating system where a special knowledge is relevant.   
 130.  See generally Santiago Montt, El TDLC como Ente Regulador del Comercio [The TDLC as 
Trade Regulation Agency] (2009).  
 131.  After the amendment through Law No. 19,911, the jurisdictional quality of the TDLC is beyond 
doubt.  
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D. Judicial Procedures 
Prosecution may be initiated before the TDLC at the request of the NEP or 
by a lawsuit filed by a private party. Once the TDLC admits a complaint, it must 
notify the affected party, which may reply within a fifteen-day period or ask for 
an extension.132 After the term to reply has expired, the TDLC may summon the 
parties to a conciliation hearing on competition law infringements.133 If the 
Tribunal does not deem it pertinent, or if the conciliation procedure fails, the 
TDLC can set a twenty-day period for the submission of evidence. 
All evidence and background is admissible for Tribunal fact-finding 
purposes.134 The Competition Tribunal may also decree ex officio evidentiary 
procedures it deems convenient in any stage of the proceedings and even after 
the hearing, when it is indispensable to clarify precise facts that seem obscure and 
doubtful.135 
Once the evidentiary period expires, the TDLC must set the date and time 
for the public hearing where the parties’ attorneys may file and argue pleadings.136 
When issuing its decision in a case, the TDLC considers both counterfactual 
evidence and alternative scenarios based on evidence gathered in the process, 
filed and produced in accordance with due process of law, in light of OECD and 
ICN guidelines and legal and economic literature.137 
In its final decision, besides acquittal, the TDLC may adopt the following 
measures if the claimed parties are found guilty: (1) modification or termination 
of acts, contracts, covenants, systems, or agreements that infringe competition 
law; (2) modification or dissolution of partnerships, corporations and other legal 
persons of private law that could have intervened in such acts, contracts, 
covenants, systems, or agreements; or (3) imposition of fines for fiscal benefit up 
to an amount equivalent to thirty percent of the sales of the infringement period 
or double the economic benefit created by the infringement.138 The fines can be 
levied on the corresponding legal person, its directors, administrators, and all 
persons that participated in the performance of the respective act.139 The fines 
levied on natural persons cannot be paid by the legal entity in which he or she 
conducts duties or by the shareholders or partners thereof.140 To determine the 
fines, the following circumstances, among others, are to be considered: the 
economic benefit obtained because of the violation; severity of the conduct;  
 
 
 
 132.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 20. 
 133.  Id. at art. 22. 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at art. 23. 
 137.  OECD, Procedural Fairness, supra note 115, at 344. 
 138.  Decree-Law 211 (2009), supra note 108, at art. 26. 
 139.  Id. at art. 26(c). 
 140.  Id. 
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recidivism; and, for the purposes of lowering the fine, cooperation with the 
NEPO before or during the investigation.141 
The TDLC uses a special nonadversarial and administrative-like procedure 
for other matters, including merger review cases (until 2016), issuing rules, 
proposing law reforms, and generating sectorial law reports. After receiving a 
request for a report or merger analysis, the TDLC opens the procedure with a 
decree published in the Official Gazette and on the TDLC website. NEPO, public 
authorities who are directly affected, and economic agents who are related to the 
matter must be notified of the opening decree so that they may provide 
information and economic evidence before the TDLC.142 Once the period for 
information collection expires, those who have filed a request may evaluate the 
NEPO’s recommendations and communicate their agreement in writing to the 
Tribunal. The TDLC must then summon a public hearing, so that those who 
contributed information may express their opinion. After the public hearing, the 
TDLC issues its final decision.143 
All TDLC decisions, except for final rulings, are susceptible to challenge 
before the same Tribunal.144 All final rulings of the Competition Tribunal are 
subject to appeal for reversal before the Supreme Court, whether in adversarial 
or non-adversarial proceedings.145 The appeal before the Supreme Court is heard 
with preference given to non-competition issues.146 The filing of an appeal does 
not suspend the execution of the ruling, except in relation to the payment of fines. 
The Civil Procedure Code is supplementary to the special procedure contained 
in Decree-Law No. 211, regarding all that is compatible with it.147 
There is an old debate about the extension of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
when it reviews a Competition Tribunal decision, with the recurso de 
reclamación. The debate started after Law No. 19,911 but has continued after 
Law No. 20,361, due to the effect to TDLC’s decisions in judicial and non-judicial 
cases.148 The term used in the law—reclamación—has not been defined, and the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is not clear either. The term reclamación is used in 
different statutes in cases of judicial ability to review adjudicative bodies’ 
administrative decisions.149 For Supreme Court Justice Milton Juica, the problem 
is that the term reclamación does not mean an appeal or an annulment, so both 
 
 141.  Id. at art. 26. 
 142.  Id. at art. 31. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at art. 27. 
 145.  Id. at art. 27, 31. 
 146.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 27. 
 147.  Id. at art. 29. 
 148. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 118; Elina Cruz & Sebastián Zárate, Building Trust in 
Antitrust: The Chilean Case, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, 157 (Eleanor M. 
Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009).  
 149.  Milton Juica, Aspectos orgánicos en la jurisdicción del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre 
Competencia y recursos procesales en el Decreto Ley N° 211 de 1973, in TRES DÉCADAS: TESTIMONIOS 
Y PERSPECTIVAS SOBRE EL EJERCICIO DEL DERECHO 37–38 (Hernán Díaz ed., 2011). 
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purposes must be fulfilled, allowing the Supreme Court to decide both law and 
facts, as it has done in practice.150 
Tapia and Montt have expressed concerns that the Supreme Court’s 
deference towards the Competition Tribunal’s decision is only superficial, 
because the Court has examined the standing of parties to request review, scope 
of the Competition Tribunal’s powers, quality of the fact analysis, interpretation 
of substantive law, and remedies imposed.151  However, a self-report by the 
NEPO and the Competition Tribunal recognizes that the Supreme Court has a 
high level of deference for the TDLC’s rulings, which are usually not reversed.152 
But deference is lower in decisions that involve industry-specific regulators, 
where the Supreme Court has quashed decisions that review administrative 
policymaking.153 Experts and practitioners usually cite a case where the Supreme 
Court quashed a predatory pricing decision issued by the TDLC without solid 
economic reasoning.154 But that decision has been overruled, and increasingly, 
the Supreme Court has devoted lengthy arguments to confirming cartel decisions 
issued by the Tribunal (such as Pharmacies and Poultry Producers). Though in 
some limited cases, where the TDLC has limited parties’ access to proceedings, 
the Supreme Court has admitted the standing of parties banned from 
participating in the TDLC. Nevertheless, these cases can be identified easily due 
to the public policy and administrative law issues perceived by the Supreme 
Court, because the chamber that hears the case is specialized in public law. 
E. Increasing Role Of Transparency And Participation In Procedures 
After the 2005 constitutional reform that established the transparency of all 
State decisions—including NEPO’s and TDLC’s—concern for the right to 
information has been a key issue for competition law bodies, even a hallmark of 
their behavior.155 The NEPO has a website where most of its decisions are made 
public,156 and where the meetings with lobbyists are posted, after the enactment 
of the Lobbying Act.157 The TDLC created its website in 2006, making all files 
and decisions accessible to the public.158 In 2015, the TDLC changed its website, 
facilitating access to decisions, files, and evidence presented in its proceedings. 
  
 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities: The Institutional 
Limits of Antitrust, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 141 (D. Sokol & Ioannis Lianos eds., 
2012). 
 152.  OECD, Procedural Fairness, supra note 115, at 348. 
 153.  Id. See also Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 173. 
 154.  Id. at 175–76. 
 155.  Competition Tribunal, Sexta Cuenta Pública del Presidente del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre 
Competencia Don Eduardo Jara Miranda 8 (2010). 
 156.  FISCALIA NACIONAL ECONOMICA, www.fne.cl [https://perma.cc/NB47-8L6H].  
 157.  Law No. 20,730 (2014). 
 158.  For records and claims, see TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA, www.tdlc.cl 
[https://perma.cc/4LSG-Z5UT].  
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The NEPO has consulted with the public about some of its guidelines, which 
is a rare practice in Chile. Since 2009, the NEPO has issued several competition 
law guidelines for leniency,159 compliance and ethics programs,160 trade 
associations,161 public procurement,162 merger review,163 vertical restraints,164 and 
public administration.165 These guidelines provide useful tools for practitioners 
predicting how the NEPO may interpret the law. 
The TDLC has also adopted the policy of public consultation about some of 
its regulations that must be applied by lawyers litigating in that tribunal.166 As a 
result of these policies and guidelines, practitioners have a clear understanding 
that the TDLC has higher transparency than other tribunals in Chile.167 
IV 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND CASES OF ABUSE 
OF DOMINANT POSITION 
Law No. 13,305, which contained the first competition law in Chile, 
established an exemplary catalogue of prohibited conduct,168 but the language 
was vague and made it possible to successfully accuse a firm of conduct not 
specifically prohibited or listed.169 These regulations were in force until 1973, 
when Decree-Law No. 211 was enacted. Decree-Law No. 211 preserved the 
broad prohibitive regulation of Law No. 13,305170 and maintained the scheme of 
 
 159.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Guía de Delación Compensada,” (Oct. 2015) (replacing 
guideline issued in October 2009). 
 160.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Programa de Cumplimiento de la normativa de Libre 
Competencia,” (June 2012). 
 161.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Asociaciones Gremiales y Libre Competencia,” (Aug. 2011). 
 162.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Compras Públicas y Libre Competencia,” (Apr. 2011). 
 163.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Guía Interna para el Análisis de Operaciones de Concentración 
Horizontal,” (Oct. 2012). 
 164.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Guía para el Análisis de Restricciones Verticales,” (June 2014). 
 165.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Sector Público y Libre Competencia,” (June 2012). 
 166.  See, e.g., Competition Tribunal Internal Regulation No. 12/2009 (regarding the relevant 
information for the preventive control of mergers). 
 167.  Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 179. 
 168.  Law No. 13,305, art. 173, April 6, 1959. 
. . . price-fixing agreements or production, transport, or quota allocations, or allocation of 
market areas; whether through agreements, bargaining or associations in order to obtain 
production reductions or paralysations; whether through exclusive dealing, done by a single 
person or by a firm, of different producers of the same specific good . . . 
 . . . convenios de fijación de precios o repartos de cuotas de producción, transporte o de 
distribución, o de zonas de mercado; sea mediante acuerdos, negociaciones o asociaciones 
para obtener reducciones o paralizaciones de producción; sea mediante la distribución 
exclusiva, hecha por una sola persona o sociedad, de varios productores del mismo artículo 
específico . . .  
[translation by author]. 
 169.  OSCAR ARAMAYO, RÉGIMEN LEGAL DE LA INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA EN CHILE 
[LEGAL REGIME OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN CHILE] 27 (1970). 
 170.  See Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 1 (“Whoever executes or signs, individually or 
collectively, any event, act or contract tending to impede free competition in the production or in the 
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the exemplary list.171 Notwithstanding, the list of conduct specified that it was not 
restrictive in nature and rounded out with a broad prohibition of: “[i]n general, 
any other discretion whose purpose is to eliminate, restrict or hinder 
competition.”172 Even a layperson with no legal training understands that the 
expression “any event, act or agreement” amounts to a general prohibition of 
human activities that could restrict competition. 
The most recent version of Decree-Law No. 211 provides for sanctions 
against “[t]he person that performs or enters into, individually or collectively, any 
event, act or agreement that impedes, restricts or hinders competition, or that 
tends to produce such effects . . . .”173 Subsequently, Article 3 lists three categories 
of prohibited conduct, such as anti-competitive agreements between competitors 
(cartels or collusive practices), abuse of dominant position, and predatory or 
unfair trade practices seeking to reach, maintain, or increase a dominant 
position.174  Nevertheless, these paragraphs are preceded by Article 3, paragraph 
2, which provides that: “[t]he following, among others, shall be considered as 
events, acts or agreements that impede, restrict or hinder competition or that 
tend to produce such effects.”175 Consequently, Decree-Law No. 211 allows the 
NEPO, private litigants, and the TDLC to interpret unlawful conducts broadly, 
preserving an unusual and wide scope of application, albeit with greater 
uncertainty.176 
Efforts have been made to reduce the law’s vagueness. These include trying 
to include a stated purpose in the law to guide TDLC decisions.177 Besides the 
 
internal or external trade”) (“El que ejecute o celebre, individual o colectivamente, cualquier hecho, acto 
o convención, que tienda a impedir la libre competencia en la producción o en el comercio interno o 
externo”) [translation by author]. 
 171.   See id. at art. 2: 
 For the purposes specified in the preceding article, the following, among others, shall be 
considered acts or contracts tending to impede free competition: a) Those referred to 
production, such as quota distribution, reductions or paralysations; b) Those referred to 
transport; c) Those referred to trade or distribution, whether wholesale or retail, such as 
quota distribution or allocation of market zones or exclusive distribution, by a single person 
or entity, of the same article of several producers; d) Those relating to the determination 
of prices of goods and services, such as agreements or imposition to others.  
Para los efectos previstos en el artículo anterior se considerarán, entre otros, como hechos, 
actos o convenciones que tienden a impedir la libre competencia, los siguientes:  a) Los que 
se refieran a la producción, tales como el reparto de cuotas, reducciones o paralizaciones 
de ellas; b) Los que se refieran al transporte; c) Los que se refieran al comercio o 
distribución, sea mayorista o al detalle, tales como el reparto de cuotas o la asignación de 
zonas de mercado o de distribución exclusiva, por una sola persona o entidad, de un mismo 
artículo de varios productores; d) Los que se refieran a la determinación de los precios de 
bienes y servicios, como acuerdos o imposición de los mismos a otros.  
[translation by author]. 
 172.  Id. at art. 2(e). 
 173.  Decree-Law 211(2003), supra note 90, at art. 3. 
 174.  Id. at art. 3(a)–(c). 
 175.  Id. at art. 3 (emphasis added). 
 176.  ALF ROSS, SOBRE EL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA [ON LAW AND JUSTICE] 149 (1997). 
 177.  Bill of Law No. 2944-03, supra note 27. 
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guidelines issues by the NEPO, whose defensive value is not clear, it is generally 
accepted that the Competition Tribunal’s previous decisions build a body of 
jurisprudence useful for scrutinizing possible infringements. A realist vision of 
law led the Chilean Congress to carry out such an approximation by eliminating 
the purpose that could contain the vagueness of expressions and prohibitions of 
Article 3 of Decree-Law No. 211. 
Decree-Law No. 211 considered a mechanism to reduce such vagueness: a 
consultative power allows the Competition Tribunal to issue a binding opinion 
concerning a consultation made by an interested party of an event, act, or 
agreement that could breach competition.178 A TDLC decision thereby lifts the 
prohibition and authorizes the event, act, or agreement in question, exempting 
the consulting party from any antitrust liability. The vagueness and 
indetermination in matters involving anti-competitive unlawful acts can be 
overcome, by way of a favorable consultation opinion, which gives a party “legal 
certainty” with respect to the conduct. 
Unfortunately, Article 3 of Decree-Law No. 211 subsists with its 
indeterminate reference to passive subjects (“any”), and also with the reference 
to dominance or market power of competitors and economic agents (“the person 
that”).179 This does nothing but extend the application of Decree-Law No. 211 to 
persons without economic power or those that are not economic agents, such as 
public persons or administrative authorities, including judicial authorities.180 
Decree-Law No. 211 states that its objective is to promote and defend free 
competition in the markets,181 but some academics have considered this 
statement imprecise and vague.182 The Resolutive Commission—the 
Competition Tribunal’s predecessor—determined that the mandate of 
competition law was not only to take care of consumer interests, but to also 
consider the economic freedom of all participants in economic activities including 
producers, entrepreneurs, and consumers, in order to benefit the society as a 
whole.183 Accordingly, it stated that “the purpose of competition law is the 
 
 178.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 18.2. 
 179.  Id. at art. 3. 
 180.  For a review of the state of the discussion, see generally Francisco Agüero, Derecho de la 
Competencia y Concesiones de Servicio Público. El Caso de las Plantas de Revisión Técnica 
[Competition Law and Public Utilities Licences: The Technical Plant Review Case] (2013). 
 181.  Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 1. Neither the NEPO’s nor the Competition 
Tribunal’s mandates extend to consumer protection nor utilities regulation. In those areas, specialized 
regulators exist. In general, regulators do not have in their respective acts rules regarding competition 
law nor competition policy mandates. Regulators usually do not file claims or initiate consultation before 
the Competition Tribunal. 
 182. DOMINGO VALDÉS, LA DISCRIMINACIÓN ARBITRARIA EN EL DERECHO ECONÓMICO 96 
(1992); Francisco Agüero, Nuevos elementos para el debate sobre el bien jurídico libre competencia [New 
elements in the debate of the ends of competition law], 19 BOLETÍN LATINOAMERICANO DE 
COMPETENCIA [LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION BULLETIN] 127–29 (2004); Pablo Fuenzalida & Mario 
Valderrama, La potestad consultiva del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia: ¿Jurisdiccional o 
administrativa?, REV. DE DER. ADMIN. ECON. No. 13 182 (2004); Jorge Streeter, Modificación de la Ley 
de Defensa de la Competencia [Competition Law Modification] 26 (Working Paper, 2001). 
 183.  RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 90, §17 (Jan. 28, 1981); Ruling 93, § 12 (Apr. 1, 1981); Ruling 
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interest of the society in [producing] more and better goods, at lower prices, 
which can be obtained ensuring liberty to all participants in economic 
activities.”184 The Competition Tribunal has not substantially modified this 
statement, although some tension has been introduced in cases when the Public 
Administration is the accused party. 
Paradoxically and simultaneously with the legislative discussion of Law No. 
19,911, the United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement provides that “[e]ach 
Party shall adopt or maintain competition laws that proscribe anti-competitive 
business conduct, with the objective of promoting economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare, and shall take appropriate action with respect to such 
conduct.”185 The usefulness of this statement is debated and considered to have 
only “symbolic meaning” because the competition policy chapter of the 
Agreement has no formal enforcement mechanism.186 However, the TDLC has 
acknowledged its use in the Chilean legal system.187 The statement, hence, is 
useful. Accordingly, the importance of the juridical good—fair competition—
arises as a guide for scrutinizing conducts that could breach Decree-Law No. 211. 
Law No. 13,305 of 1959 contained a prohibition on granting monopolies to 
private persons, admitting that, through law, monopolies could be passed on to 
public bodies if they concerned industrial or business activities.188 Granting 
monopolies was prohibited in Decree-Law No. 211, of 1973 in one of its 
“whereas” clauses,189 although the law simultaneously recognized that there can 
indeed be efficient monopolies—state monopolies, curiously.190 Later, despite 
 
171, § 15 (Apr. 10, 1984); Ruling 368, § 2 (Apr. 7, 1992). 
 184.  Id.  
 185.  United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement art. 16.1, Jan. 1, 2004. 
 186.  See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-
Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 270 
(2008). 
 187.  Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Competition Tribunal], “FNE c. Servicios 
Pullman Bus Costa Central S.A. y otros,” Rol de la causa: 224–11, § 127 (Jan. 15, 2014). 
 188.  See Law No. 13305 art. 172, Apr. 6, 1959 (“Only by law it may be reserved to fiscal, semi-fiscal, 
public, independent bodies, or local councils, the monopoly of certain industrial or commercial 
activities.”) (“Sólo por ley podrá reservarse a instituciones fiscales, semifiscales, públicas, de 
administración autónoma o municipales el monopolio de determinadas actividades industriales o 
comerciales.”) [translation by author]. 
 189.  See Decree Law No. 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 1 (“That monopoly and monopolistic 
practices are against a healthy and effective competition in the supply of markets, since through control 
of supply or demand it is possible to fix artificial prices which damage consumer interest.”) (“Que el 
monopolio y las prácticas monopólicas son contrarias a una sana y efectiva competencia en el 
abastecimiento de los mercados ya que mediante el control de la oferta o demanda es posible fijar precios 
artificiales y lesivos al interés del consumidor.”) [translation by author]. 
 190.  See id. at 4 (“That, however, the production of goods and services may or must, in certain 
circumstances, be made through bodies with monopoly and state structure, if the goals prosecuted benefit 
the community and its creation, operation and safeguards are foreseen in a law.”) (“Que, sin embargo, 
cierta producción de bienes y servicios puede o debe, en determinadas circunstancias, realizarse a través 
de organizaciones de estructura monopólica estatal, siempre que los fines perseguidos redunden en 
beneficio de la comunidad y su creación, funcionamiento y resguardos se prevean mediante una ley 
expresa.”) [translation by author]. 
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opinions adverse to monopolies granted by law,191 the Constitution only prohibits 
State monopolies in media.192 
The general prohibitions, together with the prohibition of specific conduct 
such as forming cartels and abusing a dominant position, have made the spectrum 
of complaints that can be heard by the TDLC broad. This broad interpretation 
of the general prohibitions is a result of a vague text in the law, but also built 
upon several decisions made by the TDLC and its predecessors (like the 
Resolutive Commission) in the early seventies. A decision that prohibited the 
nationalization of banks attempted by Allende’s government,193 and  decisions 
against the Chilean Central Bank provide specific examples.194 This was also a 
consequence of other legislative decisions of the Junta. For instance, Decree-Law 
No. 807, a law affecting the Department of Education, declared that the Chilean 
government should promote competition policy in all possible issues, recognizing 
that rules and regulations could affect this state policy.195 In similar terms, a law 
for leasing public land for agriculture tried to encourage competition between 
farmers.196 This has caused the State Administration itself and other 
governmental bodies to refrain from breaching competition. Private parties know 
that not only they, but also the State, can be involved in anti-competitive 
practices. This topic is controversial and deals with the scope of competition law 
if interdictions are broad. Here, the comparative approach goes from no-
immunity of State acts to competition law, with a doctrine of a state action 
immunity, as in the United States,197 to a broader approach, as the one seen in 
Chile.  
V 
PUBLIC AND RESIDUAL PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
As stated by Hovenkamp, the most flagrant anti-competitive conduct should 
be prosecuted because the total elimination of market power in the economy is 
“neither attainable nor desirable.”198 So far, the prosecution of exclusionary and 
exploitative practices represents sixty-six percent of the Competition Tribunal’s  
 
 
 191. Streeter, supra note 182. 
 192.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE art. 19, no. 12, ¶ 1 (1980) (“In no 
circumstance may the law establish a State monopoly over the media of mass communication.”). 
 193.  RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 14 (May 18, 1975). For a historical description of the conflict, 
see BERNEDO, supra note 6, 53-58.  
 194.  RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 33 (Aug. 3, 1977) and Ruling 239 (Aug. 26, 1986). 
 195.  Decree-Law No. 807, Dec. 21, 1974. 
 196.  Decree-Law No. 956, Apr. 19, 1975. In similar terms, Decree-Law No. 1341, Jan. 28, 1976. 
 197.  See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Policy: The Comparative Advantage of Developing Countries, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 72 (comparing U.S. distrust of government with prevalence 
of state-owned business entities in developing countries).  
 198.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 95 
(2006).  
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caseload.199 However, this majority is underrepresented in relation to the share 
of cartel enforcement, which represents fifteen percent of the caseload.200 
In light of the difficulty of proving cartel practices without sufficient evidence 
of a secret agreement or disguised cartel between competitors, private disputes 
normally seek compensation for damages only after a court or tribunal has 
declared the existence of the cartel. Although the 2003 reform clarified that 
antitrust damages could be litigated after the Competition Tribunal’s decision in 
a follow-on lawsuit, some private actions had previously been filed in abuse 
cases.201 More recently, private parties have sued for damages after TDLC’s 
decisions in abuse cases,202 where these parties have prosecuted the case. 
Consumers have rarely tried to sue for damages caused by cartels, and have had 
mixed results.203 In that case, follow-on lawsuits have come only after public 
enforcement. 
NEPO’s prosecutions in the past years have focused mainly on cartels. Since 
the legal reform of 2009, which granted the NEPO investigative powers like dawn 
raids and wiretapping, together with establishing a mechanism of leniency,204 
there has been a rise in prosecution of collusive conduct. Namely, the NEPO has 
learned how to use the new tools to detect and prosecute cartels. Prior to 
acquiring these tools, the NEPO’s record in cartel prosecution was poor, dealing 
mostly with tacit collusion cases or accusations of cartels without hard 
evidence.205 
This is how the NEPO experienced a major shift with respect to prosecutions, 
veering from charges of abuse of dominant position, which constituted the 
majority of the NEPO’s claims filed at the TDLC until 2008, toward charges of 
collusion. Moreover, since 2009, the NEPO has also moved to prosecuting and 
sanctioning non-compliance with merger remedies,206 failure to comply with the 
 
 199.  Data obtained from the 2016’s statistics provided at the Competition Tribunal’s website, 
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/wp-content/uploads/Estadisticas/agosto16/Contenciosas-Conductas.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZK3W-BQE2]. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Supreme Court “Alex Pivcevic y otros con Lan Chile y otros,” rol 5835-2004, (Dec. 26, 2006); 
10° Santiago Civil Court, “Servicios Audiovisuales Profesionales Sound Color S.A. con United 
International Pictures Chile Ltda.,” rol C-782-2004, (Dec. 30, 2005). 
 202.  4° Talca Civil Court, “Constructora Independencia Ltda. c. Nuevosur S.A.,” rol C-6134-2010; 
22º Santiago Civil Court, rol C-20891-2013, “OPS Ingenieria Limitada con Telefónica Moviles Chile 
S.A.,” (June 30, 2015); 8º Santiago Civil Court, “Interlink con Telefónica Móviles”, rol C-42913-201; 20º 
Santiago Civil Court, rol C-24288-2012, “Etcom S.A. con Telefónica Móvil de Chile S.A.,” (Apr. 28, 
2015); Court of Appeals of Santiago, “Phillip Morris con Compañía Chilena de Tabacos,” rol 1520-2010, 
(Nov. 8, 2011); 26° Santiago Civil Court, “Cementa S.A. con James Hardie Fibro.”, rol C-13272-2007, 
(Apr. 24, 2009). 
 203.  3 Talca Civil Court, “Luis Orlando Opazo con Asociación Gremial de Buses Interbus,” rol N° 
2646-2009, (Jan. 4, 2012); 11° Santiago Civil Court, “Arévalo y otros c. Farmacias Ahumada S.A.”, rol 
6.046-2009, (Dec. 23, 2010). 
 204.  Law No. 20,361, July 13, 2009. 
 205.  Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 173. 
 206.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 8, 2015, “Requerimiento contra de LATAM Airline Group 
S.A.” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 30, 2015, “Requerimiento de la FNE contra SMU” 
(Chile). 
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TDLC’s general instructions—especially regarding telecommunications 
matters207—and failure to comply with judgments.208 These cases represent seven 
percent of the Tribunal’s caseload.209 The public prosecution of abusive practices 
has focused on litigation of vertical restrictions, in cases against as Coca-Cola 
bottlers,210 fire-matches211 or Unilever.212 The NEPO has retained some 
prosecution of exploitative practices, mostly price discrimination or excessive 
pricing cases, in services provided by utilities such water utilities213 or electric 
distribution companies.214 
Between the creation of the TDLC in 2004 and the reform in 2009, the NEPO 
filed thirty-one actions before the TDLC. Of these legal actions, only nine were 
targeted against cartels. The lack of direct evidence impeded the sentencing of 
several accused companies in cases against asphalt insurance companies,215 liquid 
oxygen,216 shipping agencies,217 ambulances,218 cold asphalt.219 The NEPO 
encountered defeats in terms of cartel prosecution, both at the TDLC and the 
Supreme Court before it obtained the intrusive powers from Law No. 20,361, in 
2009.220 Hence, evidence of effective cartel prosecution came after new 
investigative powers were given to the NEPO. 
  
 
 207.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 15, 2014, “Requerimiento contra Telefónica Móviles Chile 
S.A.” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, May 5, 2014, “Requerimiento contra Movistar” (Chile); 
Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Jan. 29, 2014, “Requerimiento contra Claro S.A.” (Chile). 
 208. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 6, 2013, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Empresa de 
Ferrocarriles del Estado (EFE)” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 27, 2011, “Requerimiento 
FNE contra la Dirección General de Aguas” (Chile). 
 209.  Data obtained from the 2016’s statistics provided at the Competition Tribunal’s website, 
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/wp-content/uploads/Estadisticas/agosto16/Contenciosas-Conductas.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SLL6-Y4N5]. 
 210.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Apr. 19, 2011, “Requerimiento contra Embotelladora Andina y 
Coca Cola Embonor” (Chile). 
 211.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 20, 2008, “Requerimiento contra Cía. Chilena de Fósforos” 
(Chile). 
 212.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Apr. 3, 2013, “Requerimiento de FNE contra Unilever Chile” 
(Chile). 
 213.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 14, 2006 “Requerimiento contra Essbío, Essal y otras 
sanitarias” (Chile). 
 214.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 5, 2008, “Requerimiento contra Empresa Eléctrica 
Atacama” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 17, 2007, “Requerimiento contra Empresa 
Eléctrica de Magallanes” (Chile). 
 215.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Nov. 26, 2005, “Requerimiento contra Isapres ING, Vida Tres, 
Colmena y otras” (Chile). 
 216.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 3, 2005, “Requerimiento contra Air Liquide, Indura y 
Praxair, productoras de oxígeno líquido” (Chile). 
 217.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 5, 2005, “Requerimiento contra Ultramar, Agunsa y otras 
agencias marítimas” (Chile). 
 218.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 3, 2008, “Requerimiento contra Bertonati Vehículos 
Especiales y otros” (Chile). 
 219.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 13, 2007, “Requerimiento contra MK y otras empresas 
productoras de asfalto” (Chile). 
 220.  Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 173. 
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This shift from unsuccessful to successful prosecution of cartels took place 
only as of 2009, and was driven by the Pharmacies case.221 Subsequently, TDLC 
findings222 and the Supreme Court recognized that collusion was the greatest 
breach of competition: 
Collusion constitutes of all conducts breaching competition the most reproachable, the 
most serious, because it entails the coordination of a competitive behavior of the 
companies. The probable outcome of such coordination is a price increase, the 
restriction of production and with it the increase of benefits obtained by the 
participants.223 
In its cartel prosecution, the NEPO has relied not only on intrusive measures 
but also on leniency accorded to domestic and foreign companies. The first case 
of leniency was between foreign companies.224 Subsequently, the information 
provided to the NEPO in exchange for leniency toward companies has been used 
to prosecute cartels in industries such as ground transportation, marine 
transport,225 asphalt,226 and tissue paper.227 Since the implementation of the 
leniency program, the NEPO has issued guidelines clarifying the criteria in 2009 
and 2015.228 A difficulty that has appeared recently is that the Competition 
Tribunal may reject the leniency requested by the NEPO after finding that the 
leniency applicant and organizer of the cartel coerced the other members. A firm 
argued this coercion defense in a recent cartel case.229  Another problem might 
be the coordination between the competition law trial at the TDLC and the 
possible cartel offense trial afterwards, partially treated in Law No. 20,945. The 
NEPO has used dawn raids and wiretapping to prosecute cartels in the poultry,230 
ground transportation,231 tissue paper,232 and supermarket industries.233 
 
 221.  Pharmacies, supra note 58. 
 222.  Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Competition Tribunal], Jan. 7, 2010, “FNE c. 
Sociedad de Transportes Central Ltda. y otros,” Rol de la causa: 149-07.   
 223.  Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court], Dec. 29, 2010, “FNE c. Sociedad de Transportes 
Central Ltda. y otros,” Rol de la causa: 1746-2010.  
 224.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 29, 2010, “Requerimiento en contra de Whirpool SA y 
Tecumseh do Brasil Ltda.” (Chile).  
 225.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Jan. 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de Compañía Chilena de 
Navegación Interoceánica S.A. y Otros” (Chile). 
 226.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 13, 2007, “Requerimiento contra MK y otas empresas 
productoras de asfalto” (Chile). 
 227.  See CMPC Tissue, supra note 74. 
 228.  See Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 2009, “Guia interna sobre beneficios de exención y 
reducción de multas en casos de colusión” (Chile); see also Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 2015, 
“Guía Interna sobre Delación Compensada en Casos de Colusión” (Chile). 
 229.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de CMPC Tissue S.A. y 
SCA Chile S.A.” (Chile). 
 230.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 1, 2011, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Agrosuper y 
Otros” (Chile). 
 231.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 3, 2013, “Requerimiento en contra empresas de transporte 
público de Copiapó” (Chile). 
 232.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de CMPC Tissue S.A. y 
SCA Chile S.A.” (Chile). 
 233.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Jan. 6, 2016, “Requerimiento en contra de Cencosud S.A., SMU 
S.A. y Walmart Chile S.A. (supermercados)” (Chile). It should be noted that in the Pharmacies case, the 
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Furthermore, the NEPO has focused its prosecution efforts on fewer cases 
filed before the TDLC. During the seven-year period between 2009 and 2015, the 
NEPO has filed less than thirty lawsuits before the TDLC, sixteen of which refer 
to collusion charges and only six to proper abuse charges.234 Meanwhile, between 
2004 and 2008, the NEPO lodged a similar number of charges before the TDLC, 
including nine cartel charges.235 The NEPO has reduced the number of claims it 
processes before the TDLC (from an average of over six to a little over four per 
year), focusing on cartel prosecution and abandoning prosecution of abuse cases 
by companies with dominant positions. The massive repudiation of anti-
competitive practices by the general public, represented by cartels, makes 
NEPO’s  focus rational.236 
The main effect stemming of the NEPO’s change in enforcement is that the 
prosecution of abusive conducts has fallen upon private parties. Private parties 
have prosecuted several cases of abuse of dominant position and unfair trade 
practices that also affect competition policy, even without the support of the 
NEPO, or even after archival decisions of NEPO’s investigations.237 Private 
prosecution has led to follow-on lawsuits by the same parties trying to obtain 
damages awards. 
Some industries in Chile are known for having mostly private enforcement. 
The pharmaceutical industry—with the exception of the Pharmacies cartel—is 
one such example. In addition, private parties have repeatedly litigated 
government practices they have considered anti-competitive in sectors such as 
private–public partnerships (concessions), state aid, enforcement, and 
regulation.238 In these cases, the NEPO has usually refrained from intervening, 
with some exceptions in cases dealing with state-owned firms like railways239 or 
local councils adjudicating waste management sites infringing competition policy 
and public procurement regulation.240 
 
FNE reached a judicial agreement (conciliation) with one of the accused companies (FASA), which 
decided to collaborate and admit the charges brought before the Competition Tribunal. 
 234.  See generally FISCALIA NACIONAL ECONOMICA, www.fne.cl [https://perma.cc/DL7T-HDGP]. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Chilean citizens have associated cartels to abuse and competition policy. A comparison of the 
search results for the terms “collusion,” “abuse,” and “competition” with Google Trends for Chile shows 
a noticeable correlation, with significant peaks especially after a cartel accusation filed at the Competition 
Tribunal. https://www.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=CL&q=colusi%C3%B3n,competencia 
,abuso [https://perma.cc/BYQ8-QVGE?type=image]. 
 237. E.g., Silcosil Ltda., Mar. 17, 2015 “Demanda de Metalúrgica Silcosil Ltda. contra Masisa S.A. y 
Otra”; Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 12, 2015 “Informe de archivo sobre denuncia contra Masisa 
Componentes SpA.” (Chile). See also TVI, July 6, 2016 “Demanda de TVI contra VTR Comunicaciones 
SpA”; Fiscalia Nacional Economica, May 26, 2016 “Informe de archivo sobre denuncia contra VTR 
Comunicaciones SpA” (Chile). 
 238.  See generally Agüero, supra note 182. 
 239.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 6, 2013, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Empresa de 
Ferrocarriles del Estado (EFE)” (Chile). 
 240.  Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 31, 2008, “Requerimiento contra la I. Municipalidad de 
Antofagasta” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 6, 2007, “Requerimiento contra la I. 
Municipalidad de Curicó” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 2, 2005, “Requerimiento contra 
AGÜERO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2016  9:47 AM 
152 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 123 
VI 
ASSESSMENT OF CHILEAN COMPETITION POLICY 
General assessments of Chile’s competition policy system show positive and 
efficient results. A 360° appraisal published in 2013, based on data from 2011 
suggests a positive outcome.241 Recent studies reveal that consumers may shift 
their consumption habits after a cartel is discovered, punishing the cartel 
members242 or even organizing boycotts. In effect, some mistrust of the 
institutional design of the Chilean competition law system existed in the last 
decade.243 The general opinion of practitioners seems favorable, despite some 
complaints.244 A recent survey shows mistrust of enforcement agencies that deal 
with consumer abuse.245 And the survey identifies the existence of three cartels—
Pharmacies, Poultry Producers, and Tissue Paper—as one of the eight most 
severe situations of mistrust of business. This survey also shows high 
understanding of the benefits of competition policy, such as lower prices; but also 
a high perception of consumer abuse by large firms.246 Moreover, ninety-seven 
percent of those surveyed knew factual details of NEPO’s accusation in the 
Tissue Paper case.247 These results show how competition policy has become a 
key issue for consumers in Chile, and that consumers understand the risks of 
threats to competition. This success comes after a long history of legal reforms, 
modernizing institutions, and increasing enforcement. 
From the perspective of competition law practitioners, surveys done for the 
NEPO suggest that the NEPO’s effectiveness in detecting cartels has increased 
significantly from 2012 to 2014.248 Lawyers also recognize the useful value of 
guidelines issued by the NEPO. Despite the vagueness of the text of the 
competition law, specialists value efforts to clarify it. 
The history of competition law in the last fifty years shows governments and 
Congresses pushing competition law forward, in constant progress. The laws have 
been reviewed repeatedly in the last two decades, with major reforms in 1999, 
2003, 2009, and 2016. Successive reforms have tied to fill the gaps and deficits left 
by previous ones. Progressive reform accompanied by political support seems to 
have improved institutional design and the enforcement of competition policy. 
 
Coinca y la I. Municipalidad de San Bernardo” (Chile). 
 241.  Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 183–85.  
 242.  Cadem, Segundo Estudio sobre Libre competencia: “Salvando al capitalismo de los capitalistas”, 
Nov. 2015, http://www.cadem.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SACDLCII.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QC9-
DMPB]. 
 243.  Elina Cruz & Sebastián Zarate, Building Trust in Antitrust: the Chilean Case, in COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 157 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009). 
 244.  Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 184.  
 245.  Cadem, supra note 242, at 242. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id.  
 248.  Deloitte, 2° Estudio sobre la percepción del efecto disuasivo de las acciones de la Fiscalía 
Nacional Económica [Second study of the perception of the dissuasive effect of the National Economic 
Prosecutor’s Office enforcement], http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Estudio_ 
percepcion.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB32-FY37].  
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Since the early 1970’s competition law has not only been a way of controlling 
private power, but also state economic power. Success has come with political 
compromise with competition policy, whether by a democratically elected 
government or by a dictatorship. 
The vast majority of the legal reforms in the last two decades have favored 
public enforcement, enhancing investigative powers. But the fact that private 
prosecution has been residual to NEPO’s recent focused prosecution of hard-
core cartels has been an incentive for privately enforcing competition law and 
suing for damages. On this topic, the reform of Law No. 20,945 allows the 
Competition Tribunal to hear damages cases, so private parties may be more 
successful than they have been so far suing in civil courts. Hence, an unexpected 
effect of Law No. 20,945 may be a new incentive to private enforcement of 
competition law, because private parties could be more successful in this area. 
Enforcement of competition law is not exclusively a matter of public prosecution. 
Since public enforcement could be biased, allowing private enforcement to 
private parties offers a chance to punish other anti-competitive practices. 
The separation of roles stated in Decree-Law No. 211 has favored 
independence of the NEPO and the TDLC and made the transition easier. The 
two agencies can differ in procedures and decisions and may even amend each 
other’s mistaken decisions. The NEPO appears to be an independent, effective, 
and technical prosecutor.249 This autonomy may be less apparent when the NEPO 
has to deal with or investigate administrative regulators.250 The TDLC has had an 
important role in areas covered by sector-specific regulators and in topics such as 
public policy, state-aids, state-owned enterprises, public procurement, and 
regulations. In these conducts more comprehensive analysis is needed, because 
the Chilean practice is expansive compared to other jurisdictions. In this specific 
area, the Court has quashed TDLC’s judgments based on public law topics.251 
In terms of results, the NEPO and the Competition Tribunal have achieved 
excellent outcomes in cartel cases and abuse prosecution. Private enforcement 
has prospered in areas that complement the NEPO’s focus, despite recent 
reforms, which have not promoted such litigation—or at least have remained 
neutral. Political support has increased in the last years, favoring updates of 
competition law and providing resources—public funding—for investigations 
and prosecutions. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
This article attempted to uncover possible lessons from competition policy 
enforcement in Chile. Such a task is usually difficult because countries do not 
follow the same historical patterns. In that regard, Chile transitioned in the last 
 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, 183–84. 
 251.  Id. at 173. 
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forty years from a frustrated socialist revolutionary government established by 
democratic elective mandate to a market-based economy established by a 
Military Junta, and later ratified by a democratically elected government. Some 
legitimacy issues in that respect—for instance, imposition of a market system by 
military force—have been defeated by the strength of the results seen by the 
public when competition thrives, steadily creating a culture of competition. Since 
2009, the public has started to realize that cartels threaten the core of the 
economic system. Citizens may ideologically disagree with the Chilean economic 
model, but they share an understanding that cartels are the greatest threat to the 
economy. A consensus between right and left wing politicians about the harm 
caused by cartels has benefited the institutional system of competition law. 
Substantive law has mattered, creating clear prohibitions of anti-competitive 
practices like cartels and abusive practices, but also providing an open-ended 
statutory scope of possible anti-competitive practices. 
The institutional reform has worked and provided results, with a public 
prosecutor and a specialized-tribunal, but also leaving space for private 
prosecution. 
After 2009’s legal reforms, focused enforcement has proven successful in 
prosecuting and fining cartel members. A virtuous cycle started more than half a 
century ago, with legal and institutional reforms, political support, and vigorous 
prosecution, showing that success is not fortuitous, but built after legal reforms 
that steadily improve the institutional setting and investigative powers, backed 
by political and public support. 
If cartels are the greatest infringement to competition law, revealing and 
prosecuting them successfully shows that a system is achieving its ends and that 
competition policy is working for consumers and society. 
 
